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Abstract. The best way to reconcile political actors in a controversial
electoral process is a full audit. When this is not possible, statistical
tools may be useful for measuring the likelihood of the results. The
Venezuelan recall referendum (2004) provides a suitable dataset for
thinking about this important problem. The cost of errors in examining
an allegation of electoral fraud can be enormous. They can range from
legitimizing an unfair election to supporting an unfounded accusation,
with serious political implications. For this reason, we must be very
selective about data, hypotheses and test statistics that will be used.
This article offers a critical review of recent statistical literature on the
Venezuelan referendum. In addition, we propose a testing methodology,
based exclusively on vote counting, that is potentially useful in election
forensics. The referendum is reexamined, offering new and intriguing
aspects to previous analyses. The main conclusion is that there were
a significant number of irregularities in the vote counting that intro-
duced a bias in favor of the winning option. A plausible scenario in
which the irregularities could overturn the results is also discussed.
Key words and phrases: Election forensics, Venezuelan presidential
elections, Benford’s Law, multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
1. INTRODUCTION
The statistical controversies surrounding the out-
comes of the Venezuelan referendum, convened to
revoke the mandate of President Cha´vez on August
15th of 2004, generated a long spate of articles in
newspapers and occupied significant television time.
A Google search with the exact phrase “Venezuelan
recall referendum” shows more than 100,000 hits
in English. Several reports, commissioned by dif-
ferent organizations, reached opposite conclusions.
Roughly speaking, a fraud may have occurred dur-
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ing the referendum or, on the contrary, was sta-
tistically undetectable. A good example of this is
the work of Hausmann and Rigobon (2011), where
the authors claimed to have found statistical evi-
dence of fraud. According to experts consulted by
The Wall Street Journal, “the Hausmann/Rigobon
study is more credible than many of the other al-
legations being thrown around” (Luhnow and De
Cordoba, 2004). However, their early claim (Haus-
mann and Rigobon, 2004) was later rejected by The
Carter Center [(2005), Appendix 4] and by Weisbrot
et al. (2004).
The first peer-reviewed article devoted to the sta-
tistical analysis of the referendum data (Febres and
Marquez, 2006) concluded that there is statistical
evidence for rejecting the official results. This ar-
ticle, in International Statistical Review, made no
mention of the paper by Taylor (2005) which con-
cluded explicitly that there is no evidence of fraud.
Taylor’s paper is the best known reference on the
subject, widely covered by media; in part because
he was asked to investigate the allegations of fraud
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on behalf of The Carter Center. Another well-known
reference is a paper by Felten et al. (2004), which did
not detect any statistical inconsistency that would
indicate obvious fraud in the election. However, three
papers in this issue of Statistical Science (Delfino
and Salas, 2011; Prado and Sanso´, 2011; Pericchi
and Torres, 2011) support the claim of fraud. Who
is right?
The statistical papers on the referendum can be
grouped into two classes: those that only use vote
counting and those that use related additional data.
Five papers mentioned above cover the different
claims of fraud investigated by the panel of experts
convened by The Carter Center [(2005), Appendix 13].
These are:
(1) Discrepancy between official results and exit
polls (Prado and Sanso´, 2011) and unexpected cor-
relations between computerized vote counting, the
number of signatures for the recall petition and au-
dit results (Delfino and Salas, 2011).
(2) Anomalous distributions of votes among vot-
ing notebooks (Febres and Marquez 2006; Taylor
2005), including high rates of ties (Taylor, 2005) and
failure of fit to Benford’s Law for significant digits
(Pericchi and Torres 2011; Taylor 2005).
I am very skeptical about the use of data from other
sources. To make a long story short, below I men-
tion only key facts that can be extracted from the
Comprehensive Report of The Carter Center:
The months previous to the referendum were highly
polarized, with mass rallies for and against the gov-
ernment, with aggressive campaigns for attracting
new voters and to intimidate and persecute both sign-
ers (people who signed for the recall petition) and
supporters of President Cha´vez. Even the referen-
dum day was hot. The electoral actors took ad hoc
decisions that generated suspicions and lack of con-
fidence in the whole process.
In this political atmosphere, we must assume that
any unofficial information will be controversial. If
there are many doubts about the official results, one
cannot expect consensus with other data. Further-
more, one must be very careful with the statistical
assumptions that one will use.
This article has two purposes: (1) to bring order
to the ruckus caused by different statistical analy-
ses, some of them carried out by non-experts, and
(2) to examine, by a proper forensics analysis, the
allegations of fraud. Section 2 reviews the referen-
dum framework, introduces the main notation used
throughout this paper and presents a critical revi-
sion of the five papers cited above. In Section 3 we
propose a methodology, based exclusively on vote
counting, to test the recall referendum of 2004. The
presidential elections of 1998 and 2000 are also re-
viewed. Far from being a statistical headache, the
referendum is an excellent dataset to exercise a wide
variety of elementary but powerful statistical tools.
Additionally, the case of study is also useful for illus-
trating some common mistakes in stochastic mod-
eling. Section 4 summarizes the main findings and
conclusions.
2. REFERENDUM FRAMEWORK
AND CRITICAL REVIEW
The electoral process is fully described in the re-
port of The Carter Center (2005). The crucial fea-
tures for the present analysis are:
(i) A voting center consists of one or more elec-
toral tables and each table consists of one, two or
three voting notebooks, which are the official data
units with the lowest number of votes.
(ii) Within the time allowed, voters were regis-
tered to a center. Voters usually chose a center close
to their residence or workplace, many of them long
before the referendum. When the time was over, the
referee decided the number of voting notebooks in a
center according to the number of voters. In addi-
tion, notebooks are grouped in tables (no more than
three per table), mainly for logistical reasons related
to the voting process.
(iii) In each center, voters are randomly assigned
to the notebooks.1
(iv) There were only two options to vote: YES or
NO. Although there was a very small percentage of
invalid votes (0.3%), there was a significant percent-
age of abstentions (30%).
1Every Venezuelan citizen is assigned an ID number. These
numbers are assigned in sequential order by date of request.
Usually, it is done when a Venezuelan girl or boy is ten years
old. By this I mean that the number is independent of the en-
tire electoral process. The ID number of the voters (older than
18 years old) has up to nine digits and, except for a case of ex-
treme longevity, at least six digits. The mechanism to assign
voters to notebooks can be described as follows: According to
the last two digits, the voters were uniformly distributed to
the notebooks. For example, in a center with four notebooks,
if the last two digits ended between 00 and 24, then it was
assigned to notebook 1. If the last two digits ended between
25 and 49, then it was assigned to notebook 2, and so on.
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(v) The voting notebooks were computerized
(touch-screen voting machines which collected 86%
of the valid votes) and manual (ballot boxes which
represented 14% of the votes).
Both (i)–(ii) and (iv)–(v) are simple true facts
but (iii) is a statistical hypothesis. The secrecy of
the ballot lies in the random assignment of voters
to notebooks. For this reason, (iii) is essential for
a fair election. Thus, we assume it is true through-
out our analysis, with the exception of Sections 3.5–
3.7, where we suppose there were irregularities in
the allocation of voters to notebooks.
Next, let us introduce the basic notation used
throughout this paper. To do so, I will use the term
polling unit generically in the next three paragraphs
to refer to a center or a table or a notebook.
– Let Yi be the number of YES votes (those favoring
recalling President Cha´vez) and Ni the number of
NO votes in polling unit i.
– Let Ti = Yi + Ni be the total number of valid
votes in polling unit i and τi the number of vot-
ers assigned to that polling unit (the size of the
polling unit). Note the difference between voters
and valid votes.
– Let Oi = τi − Ti be the number of invalid votes
and abstentions in the polling unit i. For brevity,
we refer to them as the OUT votes (out of the
electoral consultation).
In the rest of this section, where we review differ-
ent papers, the subscript can refer to centers, tables
or notebooks. However, in Section 3 the subscripts
are used only to identify voting notebooks.
2.1 Discrepancies Between Two Exit Polls and
Official Results
Prado and Sanso´ (2011) addressed the controver-
sial discrepancy between two independent exit polls
and the official results. Roughly, the official result
was 41% YES votes and 59% NO votes, while the
exit poll results were 61% YES votes. The polls
were collected by a political party (Primero Justi-
cia) and a non-governmental organization (Su´mate),
both opposition to president Cha´vez. The authors’
main claims are:
C1: There was no selection bias in choosing the cen-
ters to be polled.
C2: The discrepancies per center cannot be explai-
ned by sampling errors.
C1 is settled by noting that the proportion of YES
votes for the overall population matches the propor-
tion of YES votes for the polled centers.
Claim C2 is addressed by assuming that the sam-
pling distribution of the number of YES answers for
a given polled center i, say yi, is a Binomial(ti, pi)
random variable. The parameters of this Binomial
are: ti the size of the sample collected at the cen-
ter and pi the proportion of YES votes, namely
pi = Yi/Ti. Under this assumption, Prado and Sanso´
(2011) showed that there are significant differences
between the official results and the exit polls in about
60% of the 497 polled centers. The authors also con-
sidered the pairwise comparison between the two
exit polls among the common polled centers (27 in
total). We remark that eight of them (30%) differ
significantly.
It appears that Prado and Sanso´ had the following
assumptions in mind to determine that yi is Bino-
mial with the parameters above:
A1: Given a polling center, the persons to interview
were selected by simple random sampling.
A2: Each interviewed person responded to the ques-
tion with the truth.
A careful reading of Section 2 of Prado and Sanso´
(2011) suggests that the sample at each center may
correspond to a more complex model than simple
random sampling. How could the used model af-
fect the estimates and conclusions of their analy-
sis? If, for example, and as seems to be, stratified
sampling was used, it will depend on the stratifi-
cation schema and the allocation criteria used by
the pollsters (Lohr, 2004). In the absence of con-
crete information, the assumption of the binomial
distribution is the most reasonable one. However,
we cannot ignore the uncertainty about the model
and, consequently, about the sampling errors com-
puted under A1.
The authors discussed briefly the consequences of
the non-veracity of A2. “It has been demonstrated
repeatedly that non-response can have large effects
on the results of a survey” (Lohr, 2004). It is quite
possible that, in a highly polarized political climate,
voters that supported Cha´vez were associated with
non-response, since they could identify the pollsters
as members of the opposition to Cha´vez. Unfortu-
nately Prado and Sanso´ had no estimates of non-
responses and so had to ignore their effects.
Other sources of voter selection bias and measure-
ment error are discussed in this paper. Some of them
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could imply a systematic bias across the pollsters.
Such is the case of the late closing of the voting
centers:
The voting centers had to be open until 4:00 p.m.
but the electoral umpire extended the closing time
twice, first until 9:00 p.m. and finally until midnight.
This was not foreseen by the pollsters and during
the afternoon and evening, there was a fierce cam-
paign to promote the attendance of the supporters of
President Cha´vez to the voting centers (The Carter
Center, 2005).
Prado and Sanso´ (2011) also studied this possi-
bility, but the available data are very limited. Al-
though the statistical procedure and motive are cor-
rect, missing data can produce results that have no
validity at all (De Veaux and Hand, 2005).
It is hard to believe that the discrepancies between
exit polls and official results are due to sampling
and random non-sampling errors. Unfortunately the
information about exit polls is limited and does not
allow a more rigorous analysis.
2.2 YES Votes Versus Number of Signers
in the Recall Petition
Delfino and Salas (2011) focused on the associa-
tion between the YES votes and the number of sign-
ers in the recall petition.2 In the first four sections of
this paper the authors described the electoral pro-
cess well. However, from the fifth section onward,
I have major concerns.
Let Si be the number of signers in voting center i.
The authors considered the following two relative
numbers of YES votes and signers:
ki =
Yi
Si
and si =
Si
Ti
.(1)
They conducted a bivariate data analysis with k as
a response variable and s as an input variable. Since
k ≤ 1/s, they said: “In voting centers with a large
value of s, we expect a value of k around 1. . . The
situation is completely different in voting centers
with a small value of s. The singularity can pro-
duce very high values of k in the neighborhood of
s = 0. Hence the level of uncertainty in k becomes
very large.” Later on, they added: “The comput-
erized centers are very far away from 1/s, clearly
2For readers who do not know the intricacies of the refer-
endum, the signatures were collected eight months before the
referendum. Many signers were invalidated and some had to
sign again in a second runoff (The Carter Center, 2005).
contradicting the expected non-linear behavior with
respect to s.” Finally, they claimed fraud because
the data contradict this behavior and even ventured
to establish a hypothesis: “In computerized centers,
official results were forced to follow a linear relation-
ship with respect to the number of signatures.”
What can justify the previous conjecture? All that
we really know is that the range of k is larger when
s decreases. How can we infer the expected nonlinear
behavior of k with respect to s from this fact? As is
shown in equation (4) of their paper,
ki =
pi
si
,
pi = Yi/Ti being the proportion of YES votes in cen-
ter i. Then, k decreases as 1/s, of course, but in-
creases as p does and there is a strong relation be-
tween these two variables. In fact, as we will explain
next, one expects the value of k to be constant with
respect to s, not only showing that the conjecture of
Delfino and Salas (2011) is false, but showing that
the results observed are as expected.
Following their schema, we analyze the (full) com-
puterized centers and (full) manual centers sepa-
rately. Manual centers are peculiar. They usually
correspond to remote locations and they have a much
smaller number of votes than the computerized ones
(Prado and Sanso´, 2011). For this reason many au-
thors perform a separate analysis of these data. There
was also a small number of mixed centers where
there were both manual and computerized notebooks.
These centers represent only 1.26% of the total YES
votes, 1.3% of the valid votes, and are excluded in
what follows.
Let γ1 = 389,862 and γ2 = 3,548,811, the total
YES votes in manual and computerized centers, re-
spectively. Consider also the total number of signers
in manual and computerized centers, that we shall
denote by θ1γ1 and θ2γ2, so that θ1 and θ2 are ratios
between total signers and total YES votes. As men-
tioned before, I am skeptical about the use of data
that are not official results of the referendum. So,
we will assume θ1 and θ2 are unknown parameters
and will only assign values to them for simulation
purposes.
As The Carter Center (2005) remarked, the sign-
ers were the hard core of the YES votes. In fact,
Delfino and Salas (2011) claimed that “each sig-
nature has a high probability of resulting a YES
vote.” Let us simplify the scenario and assume that
each signature in a center was a YES vote in that
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Fig. 1. YES votes versus simulated signatures according to the heteroscedastic linear model (4). The left panel corresponds
to manual centers with θ1 = 1/1.81. The right panel corresponds to computerized centers with θ2 = 1/1.15.
center. Thus, the ratios θ1 and θ2 are less than 1.
Under this assumption, the conditional distribution
of Si given Yi can be fitted by a hypergeometric dis-
tribution with parameters γc (the number of mar-
bles in the hypergeometric jargon), θcγc (the num-
ber of white marbles) and Yi (the number of draws),
c being equal to 1 or 2 according to whether i rep-
resents a manual or computerized center. The ex-
pected value and variance of the hypergeometric vari-
able are
E[Si|Yi] = θcYi and
(2)
Var[Si|Yi] = Yiθc(1− θc)γc − Yi
γc − 1 .
Using the standard normal approximation one ob-
tains
Si− θcYi√
Yiθc(1− θc)
≈N (0,1),(3)
N (µ,σ2) a Normal random variable with mean µ
and variance σ2. Relation (3) leads us to consider
the two heteroscedastic linear models
S = θcY +N (0, θc(1− θc)Y ),(4)
for manual centers (c= 1) and computerized centers
(c= 2).
For each center, we simulated the number of sig-
natures given the number of YES votes at the cen-
ter using (4). Typical outcomes of these simulations
with θ1 = 1/1.81 and θ2 = 1/1.15 are shown in Fig-
ure 1. The values of θc were chosen with the in-
tention of comparing our simulated clouds of points
with those shown in Figure 6 of Delfino and Salas
(2011). Note that the least squares regression lines
of the latter ones have slopes 1.81 and 1.15 using
a reverse relation between the variables, namely Y =
acS + bc + error. Thus, we take θc = 1/ac. It is dif-
ficult to see how to reject the regression model (4)
using statistical testing, even under the classical ho-
moscedastic linear model. The differences between
the clouds associated with manual and computerized
centers are due to differences in scale and variances,
included in the heteroscedastic linear model (4).
There is nothing mysterious about this difference,
as Delfino and Salas (2011) suggested. Reversing the
relationship between Y and S in regression model (4)
yields a heteroscedastic linear model
Y = βcS +N (0, σ2cS).(5)
Dividing by S, the above equation becomes
k = βc +
1√
S
N (0, σ2c ),(6)
which precisely describes the clouds of points shown
in Figures 3 and 5 of Delfino and Salas (2011), with
observations around a constant for any value of s,
although the range of k is larger when s is smaller.
In summary, it is expected that {ki} will be con-
stant with a dispersion which decreases as 1/
√
S
(note the difference between S = sT and s). Note
that, although s will be small, if T is large (like al-
most every computerized center), the variance can
be small, explaining why computerized centers are
more concentrated around the expected value of k.
There is an additional comment related to Fig-
ures 3, 4 and 5 of Delfino and Salas (2011) worth
making. Note that all right panels have a gap for
small values of the input variables (almost without
observations). Compare the figures removing these
gaps in both panels. For example, remove the win-
dows with s < 0.1 in Figures 3 and 5 and the win-
dows with less than 200 total votes in Figure 4. The
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Fig. 2. Left panel: Histogram of the YES votes (top), NO votes (middle) and OUT votes (bottom) per notebook. Right panel:
Benford’s Law for the second digit (solid line) versus relative frequencies of the second digit for YES votes = +, NO votes
=× and OUT votes = ◦.
behavior is very similar for manual and computer-
ized voting centers. Their conclusion about the dif-
ferent behavior between manual and computerized
centers seems inaccurate.
There are more intriguing statistical arguments
in the paper of Delfino and Salas (2011). Although
we have focused only on their main claim, I should
add a comment related to the data. From the least
squares regression lines shown in Figure 6 of Delfino
and Salas (2011) one can estimate the total signa-
tures in fully manual or computerized centers (ex-
cluding the mixed ones) on which the authors base
their study. This total is 3,310,200, close to the
3,467,051 signatures submitted to the electoral um-
pire (Delfino and Salas, 2011). However, the total
number of valid signers was 2,553,051 (The Carter
Center, 2005). I leave the conclusion to the reader.
2.3 Anomaly Detection by Benford’s Law
Pericchi and Torres (2011) compared empirical
distributions with Benford’s Law governing the fre-
quency of the significant digits (Hill, 1995). Con-
sidering several electoral processes in three coun-
tries, the only case compellingly rejected by their
test is the NO votes at computerized notebooks in
the Venezuelan recall referendum. In addition, they
made reference to recent contributions in which com-
pliance or violation of the law in electoral processes
has been studied. Some criticisms related to the use
of the law in electoral data (The Carter Center,
2005; Taylor, 2005) were also discussed. As theoreti-
cal contributions, the authors obtained a generaliza-
tion of the law under restrictions of the maximum
number of votes per polling station and discussed
technical issues related to measuring the fit of the
law.
It is important to note that Pericchi and Torres
(2011) did not analyze the OUT votes or absten-
tions. Figure 2 shows the marginal distributions of
each option of vote per notebook (left panel) and
compares the empirical distributions of the second
digit with Benford’s Law (right panel). Regarding
Figure 2:
• As Pericchi and Torres showed, the YES votes
conform to the law, while the NO votes do not.
However, the strongest widespread departure from
the law is related to the OUT votes. The χ2 test
statistic for this option is the highest of the three.
• It is known that compliance with the law is more
likely when the skewness is positive (Wallace, 2002),
and the only distribution with positive skewness
is related to the YES votes.
We should remark that violations of Benford’s Law
may be due to unbiased errors (Etteridge and Sri-
vastava, 1999). Thus, deviations from the law can
arise regardless of whether an election is fair or not
(Deckert et al., 2010). On the other hand, there are
many types of fraud that cannot be detected by Ben-
ford’s analysis (Durtschi et al., 2004). So, electoral
results that conform to the law are not neccessarly
free of suspicion.
To illustrate the comments above let us consider
results by centers rather than by notebooks. In Fig-
ure 3 (left panel) we show the distributions of the
number of votes at this aggregation level. Note that
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Fig. 3. Left panel: Histogram of the YES votes (top), NO votes (middle) and OUT votes (bottom) aggregated by center.
Right panel: Benford’s Law for the second digit (solid line) versus relative frequencies of the second digit for YES votes =+,
NO votes =× and OUT votes = ◦.
now all distributions have positive skewness. In the
same figure (right panel) we also show Benford’s
Law for the second digit and the related empiri-
cal distributions of vote per center. All voting op-
tions confirm the law. According to this analysis,
there is no reason to doubt the official results by
center, despite that the test suggests the contrary
when we use the results by notebook. Is the for-
mer a false negative or the latter a false positive?
Could unbiased errors in the vote counting by note-
books reproduce such a scenario? Or, conversely,
could the results by centers be masking a fraud in
notebooks? Benford’s test does not address this con-
troversy.
2.4 Irregularity in the YES Votes Distribution
Febres and Marquez (2006) tested the distribu-
tion of YES votes in the voting notebooks. In a first
round, they applied a Z test to compare the pro-
portion of YES votes in each notebook with the
proportion from the center to which the notebook
belongs. The number of irregular notebooks (note-
books with a proportion significantly different from
the proportion of the center) resulting from this
round is expected. Therefore, this analysis suggests
no inconsistency. According to the territorial organi-
zation of Venezuela, the voting centers are grouped
into parishes. The authors subdivided the parishes
into clusters of centers, using a criterion that we
discuss later. They then applied Pearson’s χ2 test
to compare the distribution of YES votes among
the notebooks at each cluster with the conditional
expected distribution given the overall results by
cluster and valid votes by notebook. In this second
round, they reported a high percentage of irregular
clusters (clusters with an outlier χ2 statistic). Their
main finding was that the irregular clusters favor the
NO option. Moreover, they showed a monotone re-
lationship between the proportion of YES votes by
cluster and the p-value of the Pearson χ2 test. Tun-
ing the confidence level to block irregular clusters,
they estimated the overall result and the winning
option is YES.
As mentioned earlier, voters within the same cen-
ter were randomly assigned to the notebooks. Thus,
each notebook is a random sample without replace-
ment from the voting center population. The frame-
work can be completely different when notebooks
are grouped by clusters of centers. If the propor-
tions of YES votes of two centers in the same cluster
are not equal, no matter how similar they are, and
if the total number of votes by notebooks is large
enough, any consistent test will detect significant
discrepancy between the proportions in the note-
books and the proportion in the cluster. The au-
thors took care of this fact. They made a trade-off
between the homogeneity of the cluster (how similar
the proportions of the centers within the cluster are)
and the number of votes per notebook. Basically, the
clusters were chosen such that the Z test does not
detect a significant difference between the propor-
tion of YES votes at the notebook with the greatest
number of votes and the cluster proportion. In this
way they ensured that each notebook is a represen-
tative sample of the cluster. The authors referred to
this as the minimum heterogeneity distance for clus-
8 R. JIME´NEZ
Fig. 4. Left panel: Exact probability density function (dashed line) of the χ2 test statistic related to the cluster with five
notebooks described in Table 9 of Febres and Marquez (2006). Probability density function of the reference distribution used by
the authors (solid line). The cross marks the observed value for the test statistic. Right panel: Exact cumulative distribution
function (dashed line) and usual asymptotic approximation for the χ2 test statistic (solid line).
tering analysis and made reference to the books of
Sokal and Sneath (1973) and Press (1982).
I have two concerns about these results. The first
deals with a general concern about the validity of ad
hoc mechanisms to identify false positives (detect-
ing fraud when none is present), which might be the
case. The second is a technical issue that must be
resolved before subscribing to the authors’ conclu-
sions.
In the referendum context, the standard cluster
units of notebooks are the voting centers. I guess
that the authors did not report results at this level
of aggregation because they did not observe incon-
sistencies at this level of aggregation. In fact, if we
apply Pearson’s χ2 test to detect irregular centers,
in the same way that the authors applied this test
to detect irregular clusters, we do not observe major
inconsistencies. Therefore, their results depend on
a particular way of clustering the notebooks. Why
these clusters instead of ones more or less homoge-
neous? Why keep the hierarchical ordering by par-
ishes instead of another more related to political
preferences? With these questions I am only trying
to illustrate natural doubts that can arise when we
introduce ad hoc criteria for grouping notebooks. If
the results were independent of the grouping level,
then this would not matter, but this is not the case.
My second concern is the use of the usual asymp-
totic distribution of Pearson’s χ2 statistic to deter-
mine when an observed value of the test statistic
is an outlier. This asymptotic does not hold in the
framework that we are considering. In general, it
is doubtful that this holds when the multinomial
distribution, which is the standard underlying as-
sumption when this test is performed, is replaced
by a multivariate hypergeometric distribution (Zel-
terman, 2006), which is the reference model for the
distribution of votes among notebooks. In particu-
lar, because all the votes of each cluster are dis-
tributed among the notebooks, the correlations are
not negligible. Despite this, I do not deny that there
is a high percentage of irregular clusters. To illus-
trate the previous comment, we consider the cluster
with five notebooks described in Table 9 of Febres
and Marquez (2006). Following the standard asymp-
totics, the authors used the χ2 distribution with four
degrees of freedom to compute the p-value of the test
statistic related with this cluster. We compute the
exact distribution of this statistic to compare with
the χ2(4) distribution. How to compute the exact
distribution is not relevant for now (it is a simple
exercise following the discussion in Section 3). The
important thing here is that an outlier for the χ2(4)
distribution is also an outlier for the exact distri-
bution (see the left panel of Figure 4). In fact, as
the right panel of Figure 4 shows, the test statis-
tic for this cluster is less than χ2(4) in the usual
stochastic order. If we had a similar result for all
clusters, then we could ensure that the percentage
of irregular clusters is equal to or greater than the
percentage reported in the paper. I believe that such
a result could be obtained. An alternative would be
to compute the exact distribution for each cluster to
recompute the p-values and the percentage of out-
liers. This involves high computational costs but it
would also allow us to test the authors’ main claim
about a monotone causal relationship between the
proportion of YES votes and the p-value.
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The conjectures of Febres and Marquez are inter-
esting and point in a concrete direction, but require
a further analysis before raising them to conclusions
of fraud.
2.5 Too Many Ties?
Taylor (2005) considered the following six models
of “fair elections”:
T1. A model in which the YES/NO votes in com-
puterized notebooks are independent and
identically distributed Poisson random vari-
ables, with common expectation according to
the results in the country.
T2. The same model as above but with a common
distribution which is not necessarily Poisson.
T3: A model in which the YES/NO votes in the
notebooks of each electoral table are indepen-
dent and identically distributed Poisson ran-
dom variables, with common expectation ac-
cording to the results in the table.
T3.1. A model in which the distribution of YES/NO
is multinomial, splitting up the YES/NO votes
of each electoral table equally among the note-
books.
T4. A multivariate hypergeometric model, condi-
tioned on the results per electoral table and
valid votes per notebook.
T5. A parametric bootstrap where total votes of
notebooks {Ti} are generated according to the
integer part of a multivariate Normal distribu-
tion. Then YES votes in notebook i are samp-
led according to a Binomial(Ti, p), p being the
proportion of YES vote in the electoral table.
Although in Taylor’s paper it is not always explicitly
said, T3–T5 are conditioned on the official results by
electoral table and T4 is additionally conditioned on
the official number of valid votes by notebook.
From these models, the author analyzed different
statistical anomalies related with claims of fraud.
Two of them have been previously discussed in this
section (Febres and Marquez 2006; Pericchi and Tor-
res 2011). The third is related to high rates of YES
ties: A YES tie is a perfect match of YES votes be-
tween two notebooks. Accordingly, his analysis can
be divided into three parts:
• Global test for goodness of fit for models T3
and T3.1.
• Comparative study between the distribution of
the significant digits according to T3.1 (also to
a slight improvement of T1), the observed distri-
bution and Benford’s Law.
• Computation of the expected number of electoral
tables with one or more YES ties, for each model;
and comparison with the observed number of ties.
His main results and conclusions can be summarized
as follows:
R1. “The more powerful χ2 test” strongly rejects
the Poisson model T3. However, a False Discov-
ery Rates analysis (Benjamini and Hochberg,
1995) shows “there is not evidence of widespread
departures for the Poisson model.” This result
“shows no systematic fraud in the form of vote-
capping.”
R2. The distribution of the significant digits of the
multinomial model T3.1 does not conform to
Benford’s Law and is virtually identical to the
observed distribution. Thus, Benford’s Law is of
“little use in fraud detection in this instance.”
R3. The Z scores used to compare the observed
number of electoral tables with one or more
YES ties with the expected number according
to his models “are fairly high” (I will make an
exception with the Z test related to T4, which
is equal to 2.37). “This only means that we
can reject the global null hypothesis” (i.e., the
global models) “and not that there indeed was
fraud.”
First of all, the validity of a statistical model is
not entirely justified by the fact that it fits the data,
especially if one wants to test the quality of those
data. The costs, here associated with a false nega-
tive (failing to identify a fraud condition when one
exists), are too high. The model should at least not
be at odds with our knowledge about the system
that is being modeled.
According to Taylor’s web page,3 “the first two
models” (T1 and T2) “are clearly unrealistic.” The
next two (T3 and T3.1) also are:
(a) As discussed in the previous subsection, the as-
sumption of independence among the notebooks
is meaningless. There are links on the sums of
votes across an electoral table. All the votes of
each table are distributed among its notebooks,
so the correlations are not negligible.
(b) The number of voters (note again the difference
between voters and votes) by notebooks varies
among the notebooks of the same electoral ta-
ble, so it makes no sense to equally split the
votes of a table among the notebooks.
3http://www-stat.stanford.edu/˜jtaylo/venezuela.
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The last two models (T4 and T5) take into ac-
count (a) and (b). In particular, I agree that the
multivariate hypergeometric approach used in T4 is
the right way to generate vote configurations. How-
ever, T5 resorts to assumptions that can be ques-
tionable, as to the use of the integer parts of mul-
tivariate Normal random variables to generate valid
votes by notebooks. Given that the two models pro-
vide similar results according to his own analysis, we
will apply the principle of Occam’s razor4 to reduce
his list to just one realistic model.
What can we conclude when a questionable dataset
does not show evidence of widespread departures for
an unrealistic model? What if the distributions of
the significant digits are similar between them but
differ from Benford’s Law? The conclusions in R1
and R2 are baseless. We cannot conclude anything
useful from these analyses.
Let us move to R3, where he considers the multi-
variate hypergeometric model and simulations car-
ried out by Felten et al. (2004) to analyze the YES
ties phenomenon. These simulations show that the
number of electoral tables with one or more ties is
high, but not high enough to be considered a sign
of fraud (around 1% of cases can have an equal or
greater number of tables with YES ties, according
to this model). This part of his analysis did not de-
tect extreme statistical anomalies that would indi-
cate obvious fraud in the referendum. Of course, as
Felten et al. emphasized, this does not imply the
absence of fraud, either.
3. REEXAMINING THE REFERENDUM
The purpose of this section is to reevaluate the
claim of fraud. An electoral fraud occurs if the re-
sults are altered to favor one of the options. Having
evidence that the changes are enough to overturn
the winner, the outcomes of the referendum should
not be recognized. Moreover, if the handling does
not change the winner, but changes the proportions
significantly, it must be considered a fraud. Elec-
toral results can affect drastically future electoral
processes. In particular, this could have happened
during the Venezuelan parliamentary elections, one
year after the referendum, in which the political par-
ties that supported the YES option withdrew, claim-
ing the possibility of new fraud. Also, a tight result
4Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (enti-
ties must not be multiplied beyond necessity).
can have a different political meaning than an out-
come with a winner by a wide margin, especially in
a recall referendum. At the end of this section we
evaluate the hypothesis of irregularities in the vote
counting to favor significantly the NO option. We
begin by describing the joint probability distribution
of results per notebook, conditioned on the complete
set of information of each center. This corresponds
to a multivariate hypergeometric model, similar to
that used in Felten et al. (2004) and Taylor’s T5
model (the differences are explained below). This is
a key tool in the hypothesis test methodology that
we develop through this section.
3.1 Shuffling Voting Cards
Consider a center with m notebooks, labeled by
1,2, . . . ,m. Let ν =
∑m
i=1 τi be the total voters in the
center. Identify each voter by a number in {1,2, . . . , ν}
such that the first τ1 voters are in notebook 1, the
following τ2 voters are in notebook 2, and so on.
In the vote counting, each voter is represented by
a voting card according to her/his electoral option.
It can be YES, NO or OUT. Let Xi be the voting
card of voter i. Then, the vote configuration at the
center can be represented by
X =
ν voters︷ ︸︸ ︷
(X1, . . . ,Xτ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
notebook 1
, . . . ,Xν−τm+1, . . . ,Xν︸ ︷︷ ︸
notebook m
) .(7)
Let y =
∑m
i=1 Yi be the total YES votes in the
center. Similarly, let n =
∑m
i=1Ni be the total NO
votes. Then, X is an outcome of shuffling the voting
cards of the center:
C = (
ν voters︷ ︸︸ ︷
YES , . . . ,YES︸ ︷︷ ︸
y YES’s
,NO, . . . ,NO︸ ︷︷ ︸
n NO’s
,OUT , . . . ,OUT︸ ︷︷ ︸
ν−y−n OUT’s
(8)
That is to say that X is a permutation of C.
According to the random mechanism used by the
electoral umpire to assign voters to notebooks, given
(y,n, ν), any permutation of voting cards has the
same probability of occurring. This is the underlying
statistical principle shared by Febres and Marquez
(2006), Felten et al. (2004) and Taylor (2005) for
testing the referendum data. However, these authors
do not consider all possible permutations:
• The sampling distribution of the test used by Feb-
res and Marquez (2006) in their first round, where
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they conditioned on results by centers and valid
votes by notebooks, corresponds to sampling on
the set of outcomes of shuffling YES cards and
NO cards in centers, leaving fixed OUT cards in
notebooks.
• The samples from the multivariate hypergeomet-
ric model considered by Felten et al. (2004) and
Taylor (2005) belong to a set of permutations even
smaller than the previous one. They conditioned
additionally on the total of YES votes and NO
votes by electoral tables. That is, they just consid-
ered shuffling YES cards and NO cards in tables,
also leaving fixed OUT cards in notebooks.
Both approaches fail to consider a large number of
equiprobable results that match the referendum re-
sults at the centers. In this paper, we compute sam-
pling distributions of test statistics considering all
possible permutations of the voting cards at each
center. To simplify the writing, in what follows, we
will refer to the result obtained by shuffling ran-
domly the cards across all centers as a random sam-
ple of the electoral process.
3.2 Statistical Hypothesis of Fair Referenda
If we assume that the referendum was properly
conducted, the results by notebook correspond to
a random sample of the electoral process. Therefore,
the hypothesis of a properly conducted referendum
is
H0: The votes per notebook correspond to a random
sample of the electoral process.
But, the rejection of H0 does not imply that the
results per notebook were altered to favor one of
the options. It only implies that there is a signifi-
cant presence of outliers in the distribution of votes
per notebook. Innocent irregularities, as the incor-
rect allocation of voters to notebooks, can generate
such outliers. We consider the most innocent alter-
native to H0, assuming that: (1) there is a signifi-
cant presence of outliers in the votes per notebook,
(2) the outliers are the result of neutral irregular-
ities, and (3) the irregularities affect a random set
of notebooks, regardless of whether they belong to
strongholds of the winning option or not. Therefore,
we consider the hypothesis of an atypical fair refer-
endum, namely,
H1: There is a significant presence of outliers in the
votes per notebook that is consequence of inno-
cent irregularities that affect a random set of
notebooks.
If there is in fact a significant presence of outliers,
we can reject H1 because: (1) the irregularities are
not innocent, introducing a significant bias in the
vote counting, or (2) they affect mostly notebooks in
bastions of one of the options. Therefore, we have to
consider the bizarre, but fair, scenario in which the
irregularities that generate the outliers are neutral,
no matter what, and, for some reason, they affect
mostly a set of notebooks that are in strongholds of
one of the options. Thus, we consider the hypothesis
of a bizarre but fair referendum:
H2: The significant presence of outliers in the votes
per notebook is the result of innocent irregular-
ities that affect mostly a set of notebooks from
strongholds of one electoral option.
The remaining alternative is a clear signal that the
irregularities are not innocent.
Before testing the hypotheses, we describe the data-
set.
3.3 Description of the Dataset
It is required to have at least two notebooks per
center for shuffling voting cards, so we restrict our
analysis to these centers. In addition, since all alle-
gations of fraud are related to computerized note-
books, we only consider full computerized centers
(centers where there are no manual votes). We also
exclude a very small number of centers with empty
notebooks (notebooks without valid votes). Empty
notebooks could arise for technical problems, affect-
ing the distribution of voters to notebooks in such
centers. After this simple cleaning on full comput-
erized centers with two or more notebooks, a con-
sistent dataset is obtained with 4,162 centers, all of
them with comparable notebooks. This means that
the votes among the notebooks of a center are in
the same order. These 4,162 centers represent 18,297
notebooks, more than 83% of the total voters, and
here will be the base of the study. The mean and
the standard deviation of the number of voters per
unit polls are 634 and 73, respectively.
For the last two subsections of this section, we
will also use the results of presidential elections of
1998, in which Chave´z was elected to his first term
as President of Venezuela with 56% of valid votes
against a coalition of roughly the same political par-
ties that supported the recall. This election was car-
ried out with an automated voting system, which
featured a single integrated electronic network to
transmit the results from the polling stations to cen-
tral headquarters (McCoy, 1999). The legitimacy of
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the electoral process and the acceptance of the re-
sults by political parties and international observers
is a guarantee of the reliability of the results. At
that time, in each center, voters were also randomly
assigned to polling units, according to the last num-
ber of their ID, similarly to the process described in
Section 2. As we do with the referendum’s dataset,
we exclude centers with only one unit poll and those
with empty unit polls. After the cleaning, a dataset
is obtained with 3952 centers, 15,667 unit polls, that
represent 85% of the total voters. The mean and the
standard deviation of the number of voters per unit
poll are 594 and 112. For all the above, both sets of
data are comparable for the statistical purposes of
Section 3.6.
A different scenario overshadowed the presidential
elections of 2000, that we consider in Section 3.7, in
which Chave´z was elected to his second term with
59% of valid votes. After two years of important po-
litical changes, including the enacting of a new con-
stitution, the criticism of Chavez’s government in-
creased, polarizing the political climate. Many claims
of fraud, including machines not properly function-
ing, people whose names did not appear on the elec-
toral registry and pre-marked ballots, were made at
that time. While The Carter Center does not believe
that the election irregularities would have changed
the presidential results, they consider those elections
as flawed and not fully successful (Neuman and Mc-
Coy, 2001). The election was carried out, roughly,
with the same voting system used in 1998. However,
there was an important difference in the number
of voters per unit poll, increasing significantly the
number of centers with only one unit. As with the
referendum and the presidential elections of 1998,
we exclude centers with only one unit poll and those
with empty unit polls. In addition, we exclude unit
polls with more votes than voters. Thus, we obtain
a dataset with 1,600 centers, only 3,730 unit polls,
that represents 53% of the total voters.
The three datasets provide estimates of high pre-
cision for the resultant percentage of votes per elec-
toral option. Table 1 summarizes their main statis-
tics.
3.4 Testing the Hypothesis of a Properly
Conducted Referendum
The way to test irregularity is to determine whether
an observed value is an outlier or not. Let i be
a focal notebook and c the center to which it be-
longs:
Table 1
Statistical summary of the dataset
Year Unit polls % of total Mean of voters Standard
voters per unit poll deviation
1998 15,667 85% 594.70 111.97
2000 3,730 53% 1662.50 361.74
2004 18,297 83% 634.60 73.86
– Since voters of a center are randomly assigned to
notebooks, Yi is the total of YES cards in a simple
random sample (without replacement) of size τi
from the voting cards of the center. In particular,
E[Yi|H0] = pcτi, with pc = yc/νc and
Var[Yi|H0] = τipc(1− pc)νc − τi
νc − 1 .
– The minimum τi in the 18,297 notebooks involved
is 347 (the mean value τ¯ =
∑
τi/18,297 is equal
to 634.60, and the maximum is 975).
Coupling these facts, a straightforward application
of the Central Limit Theorem implies that, underH0,
the score
Zi =
(Yi − pcτi)√
pc(1− pc)τi(νc − τi)/(νc − 1)
(9)
is approximately N (0,1), for any i. Therefore, a test
of regularity for a single notebook is reduced to de-
termining the significance of Z.
To get an overall qualitative idea of the joint be-
havior of the Z scores under H0, the normal proba-
bility plot of these statistics from a random sample
of the electoral process is shown in Figure 5 (left
panel). In the same figure (right panel) the normal
probability plot of the scores based on the observed
values is also shown. This plot highlights many of-
ficial results far from what is expected. Let us peer
into the most atypical cases. Table 2 shows the offi-
cial results of centers 7990 and 1123,5 where are the
notebooks associated with minimum (−9.08) and
maximum (10.54) Z value. Let us call these note-
books m and M , respectively. Under H0, the ex-
pected value of Ym is 161.81, almost twice the ob-
served value, which is 81, while the expected value
of YM is 139.08, just over half of what is observed,
which is 233.
5We use the center encoding used for the referendum.
Codes, as well as the list of centers, varies from election to
election.
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Fig. 5. Normal probability plot of Z scores based on a random sample (left) and observed values (right).
Table 2
Results in centers with notebooks associated with minimum
(*) and maximum (+) Z value
Center 7990 Center 1123
Notebook m M
Y 174 81∗ 235 191 60 233+ 62
N 272 70 375 396 137 359 143
τ 607 600 610 588 583 594 567
An overall comparison is handled by summing
squares of Z scores. Let
S2 =
18,297∑
i=1
Z2i .(10)
A straightforward computation gives E[S2|H0] =
18,297. The variance can be estimated by Monte
Carlo, shuffling the voting cards. We performed 1,000
random samples of the electoral process and ob-
tained a standard deviation of 216. Next we show
that the sampling distribution of the test statistic
TYES =
S2 − 18,297
216
(11)
can be approximated by a standard Normal distri-
bution.
The centers have between 2 and 18 notebooks.
The distribution of the centers according to the num-
ber of notebooks is shown in Table 3.
The sum of squares can be decomposed as follows:
S2 =
18,297∑
i=1
Z2i = χ
2
nb(1) + χ
2
nb(2) + · · ·+ χ2nb(18),
χ2nb(i) being the sum along all the centers of the
squares of the Z scores related to the ith notebook
of a center. Although the results of notebooks be-
longing to the same center are correlated, given H0
they are independent of results in other centers. In
turn, each χ2nb(i) is the sum of independent random
variables and each one is approximately the square
of a standard normal random variable. Then, χ2nb(i)
is approximately χ2 with
∑
m≥iCm degrees of free-
dom, Cm being the number of centers with m note-
books. Table 4 lists the degrees of freedom related
to {χ2nb(i),1≤ i≤ 18}.
In general, approximating the distribution of sums
of correlated χ2 can be difficult. Fortunately, this is
not case here. Two remarks:
– For i≤ 10, the degrees of freedom are large enough
to fit the distribution of χ2nb(i) by a Normal.
– χ2nb(1) + · · · + χ2nb(10) represents 99% of the Z2
statistics in S2.
Therefore, S2 is approximately a sum of Normal ran-
dom variables. Letting ς2 be the sample variance ob-
tained from k independent samples of S2, under H0,
the test statistic
TYES =
S2 −E[S2|H0]
ς
(12)
is approximately N (0,1), for any large k. As we said
above, we simulated 1,000 random samples of the
electoral process, obtaining ζ = 216. We also used
the samples to confirm that, under H0, the distri-
bution of TYES is approximately N (0,1). For that,
we test normality with different methods, all of them
with the same conclusive results. To illustrate, Fig-
ure 6 compares the kernel density estimator of the
probability density function of TYES with the prob-
ability density of a standard Normal.
The TYES observed value, according to the official
results, is TYESobs ≈ 13.12, which establishes that the
results of YES votes per notebook are not credible,
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Table 3
Number of clean and fully computerized centers with m notebooks
m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Cm 1,044 820 665 496 380 300 208 110 54 41 19 12 4 4 2 2 1
Table 4
Degrees of freedom (df) related with χ2nb(i)
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
df 4,162 4,162 3,118 2,298 1,633 1,137 757 457 249 139 85 44 25 13 9 5 3 1
Fig. 6. Kernel estimator of the probability density function
of TYES versus a standard Normal probability density.
given the results by centers. The p-value, less than
the MatLab precision, is strong evidence against H0.
Following the same approach, we can test regular-
ity on the distribution of NO votes and abstentions.
For that, we define the Z statistics
ZNOi =
(Ni − qcτi)√
qc(1− qc)τi(νc − τi)/(νc − τi)
and
(13)
ZOUTi =
(Oi − rcτi)√
rc(1− rc)τi(νc − τi)/(νc − τi)
,
qc = nc/νc and rc = (νc − yc − nc)/νc being the pro-
portion of NO votes and OUT votes in the center c
to which notebook i belongs. As an illustration, Fi-
gure 7 shows the normal probability plots of these Z
statistics based on a random sample of a properly
conducted referendum. The figure shows also the
normal probability plots of the scores based on the
official results. These plots show a widespread depar-
ture from the expected values, even stronger than
for the YES case (be careful with the scales of these
figures). In fact, if we define test statistics to the
distribution of NO votes and OUT votes, TNO and
TOUT respectively, similar to what we did for the
YES votes, then we have
TOUTobs > T
NO
obs > T
YES
obs .
Clearly, H0 can be completely rejected.
3.5 Testing the Hypothesis of an Atypical
Fair Referendum
As mentioned previously, the widespread depar-
ture of YESs, NOs and OUTs per notebook from
their expected values could be the outcome of in-
nocent irregularities in the conduct of the referen-
dum. Incorrect allocation of voters to notebooks and
the passing of votes from one notebook to another
during the vote counting, by bugs in the program-
ming, are examples of such irregularities. These ir-
regularities may generate, in particular, ZOUT out-
liers but, by the secrecy of the ballot, they should
not be associated with a trend in the vote counting.
Next, we propose a testing methodology, based on
a simple statistical control chart, for testing trend
in the vote counting on potentially irregular note-
books. The methodology can be easily extended to
other electoral audit frameworks. It relies on the as-
sumption that unexpected irregularities can occur
in any unit poll with the same probability.
Denote by R the ratio between NO votes and total
valid votes in the target population, consisting of
K = 18,297 notebooks, namely,
R=
∑K
i=1Ni∑K
i=1 Ti
.(14)
In sampling jargon, R is the population ratio and K
is the size of the population. Let Sk be the sample
consisting of the k notebooks with the most extreme
ZOUT values. This is the set of k notebooks with
ZOUT values furthest away from zero. Given a con-
fidence level 1−α, there is a k := k(α) such that Sk
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Fig. 7. Normal probability plot of ZNO (left) and ZOUT (right) scores based on a random sample (top) and observed values
(bottom).
matches the set of notebooks with ZOUT values that
we consider that are outliers, that is, the set of note-
books with ZOUT values out of the (1− α)× 100%
normal confidence interval. In our case study, if the
confidence level is 99%, then k = 706. Roughly, 4%
of the ZOUT values are out of the 99% confidence
interval. In what follows, k varies in a range such
that Sk corresponds to the set of outliers, according
to some reasonable confidence level.
Denote by rk the sample ratio based on Sk. That
is,
rk =
∑
i∈Sk
Ni∑
i∈Sk
Ti
.(15)
Note that rk is not the usual ratio estimator, since
we are sampling notebooks with atypical ZOUT val-
ues. Thus, we might expect that observations (Ni, Ti)
in Sk are larger or smaller than those from a simple
random sample (SRS). However, if the irregularities
are innocent, if they do not introduce bias in the
vote counting, rk should be similar to the sample
ratio based on a SRS. In particular, if k is large, the
bias of the estimator will be small and the variance
can be approximated by
Var(rk)≈ S2k :=
(
1− k
K
)
1
µ2T
s2r
k
(Lohr, 2004), with
µT =
1
K
K∑
i=1
Ti and s
2
r =
1
k− 1
∑
i∈Sk
(Ni − rkTi)2.
Thus, under the hypothesisH1 defined in Section 3.2,
if k and K − k are large enough,
ζk =
rk −R
S2k
(16)
is distributed approximately as a standard normal
variable. In what follows, we will only consider 100≤
k≪K.
To illustrate the above, consider 1,000 indepen-
dent copies of ζ500 from a random sample of atypical
fair referenda. We simulate an atypical fair referen-
dum by introducing 700 innocent irregularities on
a random sample of the electoral process. Each ir-
regularity consists in passing a random proportion of
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Fig. 8. Left panel: Normal probability plot of ZOUT scores from an atypical fair referendum. Right panel: Standard normal
probability density versus kernel estimator of the probability density function of r500, based on 1,000 independent copies of an
atypical fair referendum.
votes (10% on average) from a notebook to another
located in the same center. This handling produces
a significant number of ZOUT outliers (outside the
99% normal confidence interval) to those already ob-
tained before the manipulation. The normal proba-
bility plot of the ZOUT scores of one of these atypical
fair referenda is shown in Figure 8 (left panel) as an
example. As we can see, the shape of the plot is sim-
ilar to that observed for the referendum (Figure 7,
right bottom panel). We test normality of ζ500 with
different methods, all of them with the same con-
clusive positive results. To illustrate, the right panel
of Figure 8 compares the kernel density estimator
of the probability density function of ζ500 with the
probability density of a standard Normal.
We can test the hypothesis of an irregular fair
referendum using the ζk scores. High values of ζk
imply that irregularities introduce a bias in favor of
the NO option in the vote counting. Small values of
this score imply a bias in favor of the YES option.
Under H1, we expect ζk to be within a confidence
interval.
The ζk scores corresponding to the official results
are plotted in Figure 9 (top line), for k between 100
and 706. To illustrate the behavior that we expect
in an atypical fair referendum, we plot, in the same
figure, 100 simulated scores series of the atypical
fair referendum discussed above. The ζk scores cor-
responding to the official results are well above the
99.99% confidence interval (−3.9,3.9) for 100≤ k ≤
706. Although a small number of simulated trajec-
tories also reach high values, all of them are embed-
ded in (−3.9,3.9) and most of them are in the 99%
confidence interval (−2.58,2.58), as one expects.We
Fig. 9. ζk versus k for official results (top line) and simu-
lated atypical fair referenda.
observed similar behavior in 1,000 additional sim-
ulated trajectories (not plotted). The scores series
of the referendum reaches values higher than any
that we observed in simulations, being the only one
always well above 3.9, for 100 ≤ k ≤ 706. This pro-
vides strong evidence against H1 than a fairly small
p-value of a ζk score, for some k. We are seeing a sig-
nificant bias in the vote counting on notebooks as-
sociated with irregularities, which is almost impos-
sible to observe under H1. All the above is strong
evidence for rejecting it.
3.6 Testing the Hypothesis of Bizarre but Fair
Referendum
Most political scientists expect more innocent ad-
ministrative errors in areas with more poor voters
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Table 5
Results in Center 1123 (C. M. A. Dr. Angel Vicente Ochoa,
in Santa Rosal´ıa, Caracas)
Notebook 1 2 3 4
Y 191 60 233 62
N 396 137 359 143
τ 588 583 594 567
(M. Lindeman, personal communication, July 2010).
In addition, “the conventional wisdom about con-
temporary Venezuelan politics is that class voting
has become commonplace, with the poor doggedly
supporting Hugo Cha´vez while the rich oppose him”
(Lupu, 2010). If both beliefs are true, we expect
more innocent irregularities in strongholds of the
NO option, which would explain the atypical result
observed in the above section. That is what H2 de-
scribes, a general scenario in which there are more
innocent irregularities in centers that support the
winning option. To illustrate this possibility, we show
in Table 5 the results in Center 1123 (C. M. A. Dr.
Angel Vicente Ochoa, in Santa Rosal´ıa, Caracas),
one of the most extreme results. All its notebooks
are associated with very extreme ZOUT values
(greater than 18.53!). But the overall NO propor-
tion (65%) is even less than that observed in the
presidential elections of 1998 (67%). This center ap-
pears to be a bona fide Cha´vez stronghold. However,
we have to remark that, in this election, the ZOUT
values of that center are quite normal, all of them
between −0.4 and 0.40. The results, only three unit
polls in that election, are shown in Table 6.
A naive procedure to see if the irregularities af-
fected mostly notebooks in Cha´vez’s strongholds
would be repeating the previous analysis on all cen-
ters with outliers. We consider an alternative anal-
ysis for an important reason: If indeed tampering
occurred, it is possible that, in order to mask the
stuff, the irregularities were committed precisely in
Cha´vez’s bastions. In addition, we have to admit
that we do not have access to the re-coding of cen-
ters to automatize the procedure.
Lupu (2010) provided evidence that the presiden-
tial election of 1998 was more monotonic in class
voting than the referendum. This means, the poor
were more likely to vote for Cha´vez in 1998 than in
2004. Thus, we expect more innocent irregularities
in Cha´vez’s strongholds in 1998 than in 2004. In ad-
dition, there is not doubt about the legitimacy of
this election (Neuman and McCoy, 2001). For these
Table 6
Presidential elections of 1998, results in
C. M. A. Dr. Angel Vicente Ochoa Center
Unit poll 1 2 3
Y 182 115 123
N 357 265 247
τ 899 645 624
reasons, the election of 1998 is very appropriate to
test if irregularities affect mostly notebooks in cen-
ters that support Cha´vez, that is, to test H2, de-
fined in Section 3.2. The testing schema we use is
to reject H2 if we fail to reject H1 for the elections
of 1998. We begin verifying that there is a signifi-
cant presence of ZOUT outliers in 1998: 5% of ZOUT
values (797 of 15,667) are out of the 99% normal
confidence interval. The evidence against H0 is of
the same order as in 2004. Furthermore, the most
extreme ZOUT values of 1998 are higher than those
observed in 2004. We omit the details and summa-
rize results by showing the normal probability plot
of the ZOUT scores in Figure 10 (left panel). It seems
possible that, in complex elections, ad hoc decisions
are made to resolve problems that arise on the fly.
As we have discussed previously, this can produce
large outliers in the vote distribution. However, the
test discussed in the previous section strongly sup-
ports H1 for the presidential elections of 1998. The
corresponding scores series {ζk,100≤ k ≤ 797} is al-
most embedded in the 99% confidence interval; see
right panel of Figure 10. Therefore, we see that there
is little reason to think that the significant presence
of ZOUT outliers, that are the result of innocent ir-
regularities, affect mostly a set of notebooks from
Cha´vez’s strongholds. Irregularities seem to occur
randomly, regardless of whether the notebook be-
longs to a Cha´vez bastion or not, and thus, we re-
ject H2.
3.7 Estimating the Effect of the Irregularities
We have provided statistical evidence that there
was a significant presence of irregularities that fa-
vored the winning option in the vote counting of
2004. But, how much could the irregularities affect
the overall results? Suppose that the ZOUT outliers
are the tip of the iceberg and there is bias in the
vote counting of a high proportion of notebooks, not
just in the notebooks with extreme ZOUT values. To
evaluate this assumption, we analyze the behavior
of the sample ratio rk in (15) for higher values of k
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Fig. 10. Left panel: Normal probability plot of ZOUT scores of the presidential elections of 1998. Right panel: ζk versus k
for presidential elections of 1998.
Fig. 11. Proportion of Cha´vez’s votes in Sk versus k for the
referendum (top line) and presidential elections of 1998 (line
from the middle to the bottom) and 2000 (line from the bottom
to the middle).
than those that we have already considered. Fig-
ure 11 shows that proportion for k varying from 100
to 3000 (top line). The shape shows a strong corre-
lation between the trend in the vote counting and
the discrepancy between valid votes and its expecta-
tion, not only in notebooks with ZOUT outliers. We
remark that for k = 100 we are considering 41,533
valid votes, a very large sample size for estimating
proportions (an accepted standard for pollsters is
above 1,000). What we expect when we increase the
sample size is exactly what we have for the pres-
idential elections of 1998 (line from the middle to
the bottom in Figure 11): The proportion is a func-
tion of the sample size that slightly varies around
the population proportion, and that quickly stabi-
lizes around this value. So, our assumption of irreg-
ularities that affect the vote counting across all the
notebooks is quite possibly true.6 Let us measure
how much it could affect the totals.
Let R be the population ratio defined in (14).
Bounds for the relative error, introduced in the vote
counting by the irregularities, can be obtained maxi-
mizing and minimizing the relative error (rk−R)/R.
Thus, we can provide a prediction interval for the
corrected proportion of votes in favor of Cha´vez,
namely, [
max
100≤k≤K/2
(
1− rk −R
R
)
R,
(17)
min
100≤k≤K/2
(
1− rk −R
R
)
R
]
,
K being the total number of notebooks. Note that
we are considering up to 50% of the notebooks (k≪
K), those with the highest |ZOUT| values.
For example, the prediction interval (17) for the
presidential election of 1998, in which Cha´vez won
with 56% of valid votes, is [55%,57%]. We remark
that this is an example of an atypical but fair elec-
tion, where the results were well accepted by politi-
cal parties and international observers.
Let us consider next the presidential elections of
2000. As mentioned above, The Carter Center con-
siders this election as flawed and not fully successful.
6Mart´ın (2011), which unfortunately was not available for
my review, studies the volume of traffic in incoming and out-
going data between notebooks and totalizing servers. It pro-
vides evidence that the vote counting of a high percent of
notebooks could be affected from the totalizing servers.
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Fig. 12. Left panel: Normal probability plot of ZOUT scores of the presidential elections of 2000. Right panel: ζk versus k
for presidential elections of 2000.
However, they also emphasize that the irregularities
did not change the presidential results. Our method-
ology confirms their conclusion. Figure 12 summa-
rizes our testing analysis. We observe the highest
presence of ZOUT outliers in 2000: 9% of ZOUT val-
ues (327 of 3730) are outside the 99% normal confi-
dence interval. Also, the most extreme ZOUT scores
of 2000 are higher than the observed in 1998 and
2004. But, there is not evidence to reject H1 for this
election. The ζ scores series is always in the 99%
normal confidence interval, except for a short ex-
cursion. Moreover, the prediction interval (17) for
this election is [59%,62%], and Cha´vez was elected
with 59% of the valid votes.
We do observe a controversial result in the referen-
dum, managed by a different electoral umpire from
those that managed the elections of 1998 and 2000:
The prediction interval is [47%,57%]. The official
result (59%) is out of range, while results that over-
turn the winner are within. We remark that while
this is not proof that irregularities changed the over-
all results, it does illustrate that such a scenario is
plausible. Certainly, the result should be, at least,
more in line with the prediction interval.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The main tool for conciliating political actors in
an election under suspicion of fraud is a full audit.
When this is not possible, statistical methods for de-
tecting numerical anomalies and diagnosing irregu-
larities can be useful for evaluating the likelihood of
the allegations of fraud. This is the aim of election
forensics (Mebane, 2008), an exciting area of ap-
plied statistics. Election forensics has been applied
for several recent controversial elections, including
2004 USA, 2006 Mexico, 2008 Russia and 2009 Iran
(Mebane, 2011); see the personal web page of Wal-
ter Mebane.7 The Venezuelan recall referendum is
a case study that shows a wide pallet of the com-
monly used statistical tools and problems that can
arise in this type of analysis, as shown by our re-
view in Section 2. In particular, we have highlighted
problems related to exit polls, causal relationship
between number of votes and dependent variables,
Benford’s Law, different levels of data aggregation,
goodness of fit, and election modeling. Beyond the
statistical learning, the hard criticism of some of the
papers reviewed relates to a deep concern about the
future of this emerging area. I am convinced that the
diffusion of inaccurate analyses only causes founded
allegations of fraud to be undervalued. At least, this
was the case of the Venezuelan referendum.
We propose a forensic election methodology, based
only on vote counting, to analyze the referendum.
Also the Venezuelan presidential elections of 1998
and 2000 are reviewed. Unlike previous work, we
used the full information of the official dataset. This
consists not only of the number of votes for and
against revoking the mandate of President Chavez,
but also the number of abstentions and invalid votes
at the official data unit with the lowest number of
votes. The main conclusion of the present paper is
that there were a significant number of irregularities
in the vote counting that introduced a bias in favor
of the winning option. We provide prediction inter-
vals for the bias, showing that the scenario in which
7www-personal.umich.edu/˜wmebane.
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the bias could overturn the results is plausible. This
places solid evidence in the arena, substantiating the
allegations of fraud made at the time.
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